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VOLUME

FROM 1945 March

TO 1945 July

SUBJECT

COLONIAL OFFICE

British Clandestine Organisation  
in China

RS 7 91214



TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

## Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
JIC (45) 105 (0) Final	28 March 1945
JIC /372/45	23 March 1945
JIC /384/45	25 March 1945
JIC /385/45	25 March 1945
JIC /395/45	27 March 1945
JIC /396/45	27 March 1945
JIC /397/45	27 March 1945
JIC /399/45	27 March 1945
JIC /412/45	29 March 1945
JIC /428/45	1 April 1945
JIC (45) 111 (0) (Draft)	2 April 1945
JIC (45) 111 (0) Final	3 April 1945

The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.

For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB.(CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_



D 42/3

Return to Mr. Stead

D 42/3

16/4/73

# S.O.E. OPERATIONS IN CHINA

BRITISH CLANDESTINE  
ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA

Previous

Subsequent

## MOST SECRET

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TOP SECRET

Copies to: C.D.  
Colonel G.F. Taylor  
Mr. Eden  
Mr. Oliver Stanley

PRIME MINISTER

S.O.E. IN THE FAR EAST

In accordance with our current Directive from the Chiefs of Staff COS(44)957(0) of the 9th November, 1944, S.O.E. have been endeavouring to conclude agreements in Chungking as to the role to be assigned to them in China. Although General Wedemeyer has stated that he rates highly the S.O.E. type of operation and that in his view the bulk of the Chinese forces are best used in irregular activities, it has nevertheless become clear that he would prefer to use only American Organisations for these purposes in China and unless an overwhelmingly strong case can be made out, he will not allot to the British any role whatever.

S.O.E. are faced with precisely the same issue in General MacArthur's theatre.

I am not desirous of intruding where we are not wanted, but it is germane to remember that we invited O.S.S. into the Balkans when it was a purely British theatre and shared our work there and in all other European operations with them in close integration. We have now a number of officers who have been trained in guerilla warfare for three years and have distinguished themselves as guerilla leaders and I believe that, given certain limited airlift, S.O.E. can make a contribution in these theatres towards the defeat of Japan, in particular by the organisation, training and employment of guerilla forces in accordance with the technique which we have learned by experience in the South East Asia Command and elsewhere. If S.O.E. were able to conduct such guerilla operations successfully, British prestige amongst the Chinese would be enhanced and our recovery of Hongkong and British Borneo might well be facilitated.

At present my commitment in China is very small indeed, whilst in S.W.P.A. it is not much larger than the minimum required to support from S.W.P.A. Admiral Mountbatten's operations. I am in no way anxious to develop these commitments or to struggle to secure a role for S.O.E. in the American theatres, with all the difficulties and complications which that will entail, unless His Majesty's Government desire to maintain this British participation in the struggle against Japan in these areas. If this is indeed their wish, I will of course do everything possible, but strong backing from other departments will be required and some additional material help will have to be given.

I shall be grateful for your guidance as to the line I should follow.

I am sending copies of this Minute to the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries.

SGD. SELBORNE.

15th March, 1945.



TOP SECRET

16th March, 1945.

GFT/1763.

Dear Genl,

Further to our conversation of this afternoon, in case there may be some delay in your receiving your copy of Lord Selborne's Minute to the Prime Minister from your Secretary of State I am sending you personally a copy attached hereto.

As I indicated in our conversation this afternoon, I feel that if the Colonial Office have any views on the subject of this Minute (whether for or against a continuance by S.O.E. of their attempts to push their way into the China and South West Pacific Theatres) now is the time for them to put them forward. All we in S.O.E. want is a definite decision on policy to which we can conform.

As you are no doubt aware, General Hurley, the American Ambassador in Chungking, is paying a visit to London, arriving today or tomorrow, at the invitation of the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff, with the object of discussing the activities and organization of British clandestine services in China. The Chiefs of Staff have also arranged for Air Vice Marshal Whitworth Jones, representing S.A.C.S.E.A., Colonel Cartwright, representing General Carton de Wiart, and possibly a representative of C.-in-C., India, to come to London for this Conference.

If you feel that the Colonial Office have an interest in this subject - which in view of the



Hong-Kong position seems to me to be the case -  
 I hope you will be able to arrange to be  
 represented. I believe that preliminary  
 discussions are in charge of the J.I.C.

*Yours sincerely*  
*B. J. Taylor*

G.E.J. Gent, Esq.,  
 Colonial Office,  
 S.W.1.



Top Secret

PRIME MINISTER

The Minister of Economic Warfare has sent me a copy of his minute to you of the 15th March on the subject of S.O.S. operations in the Far East.

The Colonial Office has a major interest in the establishment of a recognised British military force both in Borneo and in South China. There are no British operational forces of the ordinary sort in either theatre and we have therefore to rely on para-military forces to show the flag in connection with the liberation of Borneo and Hong Kong. Moreover, our experience hitherto suggests that intelligence of conditions both in Borneo and Hong Kong will depend entirely on



on our having a British (or in Borneo Australian closely co-operating with a British) organisation for the purpose.

I therefore attach the greatest importance to S.O.S. retaining a recognised role in areas suitable for their activities against the Japanese, especially in South China and also (in association with their Australian counterpart, S.O.A.) in Borneo.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign Secretary and to the Minister of Economic Warfare.

21st March, 1945.



M.O.I.(S.P.)

3.

The War Office,  
Whitehall,  
London, S.W.1.

27th March, 1945.

Any further communication on this  
subject should be addressed to:—

GFT/1773

Dear Gent,

Further to our telephone conversation of this  
afternoon, I am sending you herewith copies of:—

1. The paper which we wrote when we were asked to  
put forward our idea of how British Services in  
China should be organized. This is headed  
"Organization of British Services in China.  
Proposals put forward by S.O.E." and was  
circulated by the J.I.C. as JIC/384/45.
2. A second paper which we were asked to write  
when it was realized that it was useless  
discussing what was the right organization of  
British Services in China until it had been  
decided what the Services were there for.  
This paper is headed "Para-Military and  
Subversive Activities in China" and has been  
sent down to the J.I.C. this afternoon, who  
will circulate it to all concerned.

The whole of this business began when the J.I.C.  
sat to consider certain proposals for the organization  
of British Services produced at a meeting at Chungking  
and brought home by Air Vice Marshal Whitworth Jones.  
These proposals, whilst possibly workable if there was  
to be no more British activity in China than the present  
Intelligence and M.I.9 and M.I.19 work which is being  
carried on, would be quite unworkable if it were desired  
than an operational role should be allocated by the  
China Command to any British Service.

It is intended that the J.I.C. discussions should  
converge with the reference to the Chiefs of Staff by  
the Prime Minister of the minute which has been

P.T.O.



The War Office  
Whitehall  
London S.W.1

2.

1. submitted to him by Lord Selborne, of which a copy was sent to your Secretary of State.

I understand you have been asked to attend the meeting at 10. o'clock tomorrow.

*John Taylor*

G.E.J. Gent, Esq.,  
The Colonial Office,  
S.W.1.



PARA-MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS  
IN CHINA.

1. As a result of the discussions of the last three days the conclusion has been reached that it is impossible to make recommendations as to the way in which the British Services in China should be organized until the major question of the role which it is desired those Services should carry out has been settled.

It has therefore been agreed that a decision should be sought from the appropriate high authority as to whether it is the policy of His Majesty's Government that an effort should be made to secure the allocation by the China Command of some para-military and subversive role to a British organization in China over and above the present Intelligence and M.I.9. and M.I.19 activities which are now being carried out in China for outside authorities.

It has been noted that this issue has, in effect, already been raised by Lord Selborne's minute to the Prime Minister (copies to Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and the Colonies) of the 15th March, of which a copy is attached at A.

In order to brief the Chiefs of Staff on this issue, which it is assumed must eventually be referred to them, we understand that the J.I.C. and J.P.S. wish to be able to set out the position regarding the desirability and practicability of an operational contribution being made by the British on the para-military and subversive plane to the war in China, and to make recommendations for or against the adoption of such a policy.

S.O.E. have accordingly been asked to put forward, in as concrete a fashion as possible, their idea of what the adoption of such a policy would involve, how it could be implemented, and what advantages might be expected from it.

2. In attempting to meet this requirement S.O.E. must point out that it is impossible for them to put forward an altogether concrete or hard and fast plan. Any scheme for a British operational role in China must be acceptable to the China Command and it is not likely to secure approval of this Command unless it fits in with their general plan for the conduct of the war in China. We are not yet aware of the nature of this general plan, and any ideas which we put forward must therefore be subject to the qualification that they may require to be amended, perhaps radically, in order to conform to the ideas of the China Command. In this paper we can only put forward what seems to us the most practical scheme, taking into account everything that we know of the situation in China and the intentions of the Generalissimo and General Wedemeyer.

3. It seems to us that the main features of any operational role to be undertaken by a British organization in China would have to be as follows:-

A. Character of work.

In view of the known attitude of the Chinese authorities, and the views very clearly and firmly expressed by General Wedemeyer at his meeting of the 24th January, we feel that the only para-military and subversive work worth considering is that of support and direction by a British organization of resistance elements behind the Japanese line, approved by the Central Government.

7 The proposed British organization (refer JIC/384/45) would endeavour to work with such Chinese resistance elements for the purposes of:-

- (1) Supporting, encouraging and directing them in guerrilla warfare in order to harry the Japanese and interfere with their lines of communication



in areas and at points decided by the China Command from time to time.

- (ii) Carrying on general small scale sabotage and subversive activity, encouraging covert resistance to the Japanese, and psychological warfare.
- (iii) Action as directed by the China Command to impede Japanese concentrations in the event of Allied landings in any area where the organisation is working, or other military operations against occupied China from the mainland.

#### B. Organization.

The above general programme would involve the following organization:-

- (i) Once the <sup>Chinese</sup> elements with whom it is proposed to work have been selected, in conjunction with the Chinese and General Wedemeyer, contact would have to be made with them in so far as it has not been done already, and small British liaison missions, consisting of a liaison officer and certain specialized personnel, attached to them.
- (ii) Simultaneously, a ~~complete~~ system of W/T communications would have to be organized between the units in the field and the war station at Kunming.
- (iii) Stores of light arms and equipment, including clothing, medical supplies etc. but not food, would have to be accumulated at suitable points in Free China, and an organization built up on normal S.O.E. lines for the supply of these stores to the resistance elements. This would have to be done largely by air dropping, though, assuming full co-operation of the Central Government was secured, a certain amount of land transport would be possible. The possibility would also have to be investigated of maintaining resistance elements from the Philippines both by sea and air.
- (iv) Once the organization for the supply of resistance elements was functioning the principal role of the liaison officers attached to them (in addition to arranging reception and distribution) would be that of giving direction in regard to the carrying out of operations in accordance with instructions received from the China Command.

#### C. Location.

The resources available to a British organization are not sufficient to enable it to provide services of this kind to the China Command over a large part of China, as may be the case with O.S.S. It would be essential to endeavour to secure the concentration of the British effort in some limited area. The most suitable area from every point of view, and that for which the British organizations should press the China Command, would be the Provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung for the following reasons:-

- (i) The British personnel available for this work are, to a considerable extent, more expert in this area of China than in any other.
- (ii) The area is that of the greatest interest and importance to His Majesty's Government in view of the proximity of Hong Kong and the New Territories.
- (iii) The area is that in which the British organization would get the greatest support from the Chinese, and the one where influential elements of the Chungking Government would most gladly see British activity undertaken. This applies particularly to General



Pai Chung Hsi, Deputy Chief of Staff at Chungking and the principal Kwangsi leader who has remained loyal to the Generalissimo, and Admiral Chan Chak who is the Generalissimo's representative for the fostering of resistance in this area.

- (iv) This location would make it possible for the proposed British organization to make the fullest use of the expert B.A.A.G. personnel for general purposes, whilst at the same time continuing to carry out to the fullest degree the M.I.9. and M.I.19 activities at present being undertaken by B.A.A.G.

#### D. Scale.

The scale of the activity to be undertaken initially must be determined by the extent of the resources likely to be made available in the near future.

Clearly the most important factor in this respect is air lift, but this is dealt with separately in paragraph 5. below. The other factors which are all within British control are the personnel and equipment necessary for the actual operations in the field, and the personnel and equipment (including finance) at Headquarters and Advance Headquarters in Free China. On the basis of our experience elsewhere, preliminary discussions with the War Office in regard to the supply of equipment, and tentative plans which have already been roughed out, we would estimate that it would be reasonable to attempt, within the area suggested, to operate on a scale which would provide for the maintenance of 30,000 guerrillas. eventually

#### 4. Resources

From the point of view of the practicability of the programme outlined above, the following is the position as we see it regarding resources available or likely to be available in the foreseeable future to meet indicated requirements.

##### A. Personnel

The following could be reckoned on for a unified organization as proposed in JIC/384/45.

- (1) The total personnel of the B.M.M. at present consists of 52 at Headquarters at Chungking, made up of 17 officers and 35 other ranks, and a Field Establishment ~~mk~~ consisting of an advanced Headquarters, 15 officers (filled); a Demolitions Training Wing, 11 officers (filled); an Artillery and Weapon Training Wing, 28 officers and other ranks (not filled); a Field Team of 14 officers (largely but not wholly filled); a number of officers on ls. of c. and demolition depot, and some 6 officers still attached to General Li Mo An in Kiangsi and Fukien. The whole Field Establishment of the B.M.M. has been withdrawn to India to re-fit. Neither it nor the large Headquarters in Chungking have at present any operational role, nor can they have one until it is allotted to them by General Wedemeyer. There is, therefore, nothing unreasonable in the suggestion that the whole of this personnel should be considered as available for pooling in a unified British operational organization if such a policy were to be adopted.
- (ii) B.A.A.G. personnel consist of rear Headquarters at Kunming (B.A.A.G. West) 4 British officers, 2 V.C.O.s, 3 B.O.R.s; B.A.A.G. East, made up



of an advance party of 7 officers and 2 B.O.R.s, which has already gone in, and a further party of 6 officers, 1 V.C.O. and 36 B.O.R.s still waiting at Kunming; an advance post at Poseh of 2 officers and 2 stations in Southern Kwangtung totalling 7 British officers, 1 V.C.O., 1 B.O.R. The experience of B.A.A.G. over the last 18 months has amply demonstrated that an organization working behind the Japanese line in Southern Kwangtung is quite capable of combining M.I.9 and M.I.19 work with all other activities which can be carried on behind the enemy's lines. What is proposed, therefore, is that the present B.A.A.G. personnel (which incidentally includes 6 officers seconded by S.O.E. to B.A.A.G.) should be pooled in the unified organization on the clear understanding that the organization would make itself responsible for the execution to the fullest extent of the M.I.9 and M.I.19 activities in the area concerned at present being carried out as their primary function by B.A.A.G.

- (iii) All S.O.E. personnel already in China who are suitable for para-military and subversive work would of course be available to the organization. This represents the 14 British officers and 14 other ranks now in Chungking and Kunming and includes the Kunming W/T War Station which already carries all signals for B.A.A.G.

Furthermore, S.O.E. would automatically make available the personnel, both field parties and base organization, which is being released from Western theatres as S.O.E.'s work in that area is coming to an end. This personnel would of course be highly trained and experienced in all the operational and Headquarters work required in the activities in question. No exact figure can be given for the number in each category which would be available at a given date, but it can safely be assumed that adequate personnel could be made available to start operations on a small scale and develop them as larger numbers were progressively released from Europe.

- (iv) It has been suggested in JIC/384/45 that the unified British organization, if formed, should take over the personnel of E Group and G.B.T. at present in China. As, however, this would only be on the understanding that the organization would make itself responsible for the continuation of this work and as, for geographical reasons, the same personnel would have to continue to do it exactly as at present, this would not represent any addition to the pool for the new operational role envisaged above.

#### B. Arms and Equipment.

The provision of the necessary arms and equipment for the maintenance of 30,000 guerrillas has already been tentatively discussed with the War Office. Estimates which covered these requirements were submitted to the War Office at the end of December and the latter have indicated in the usual form that, subject to the absence of abnormal developments in the European theatres, it should be possible to meet the demand by the dates indicated



in the staging proposed.

C. Air Lift.

C. The vital element of air lift is dealt with separately in para. (5) below.

## 5. The Problem of Air Lift.

A. In the original plan which was worked out by S.O.E. for the Chinese authorities and based upon the maintenance of 30,000 guerrillas, the air lift involved in the carrying out of the operations inside China amounted to a total of 553 sorties over a period of nine months, rising from 19 sorties using 7 aircraft in the first month to 91 sorties using 31 aircraft in the ninth month.

This may be optimistic reckoning as the figures still require detailed calculation.

To enable the necessary stores to be assembled in China, it will be necessary for General Wedemeyer to allocate a tonnage lift over the Hump of approximately 120 tons per month out of his present total lift of approximately 37,000 tons per month.

Even these figures cannot be regarded as by any means definitive, as they represent an optimum figure based upon what we consider should be done if the necessary resources were available.

If General Wedemeyer, as is only too likely, were reluctant to commit himself on the above basis, it would still be quite possible to commence operations on the modest basis of the use of 7 planes, i.e. half a squadron, and build up the work only as increased resources became available.

B. It is fully appreciated that at the present moment it is inadvisable to raise the question of the possible use of British aircraft for these operations in view of the reaction which such a suggestion might have upon the position as regards the American contribution towards Admiral Mountbatten's Burma campaign. This situation, however, will presumably alter at a relatively early date as a result of the fact that with the fall of Rangoon Admiral Mountbatten will cease to be dependent upon American aircraft in S.E.A.C. (which will then in any event be returned to the China Theatre), whilst about the same time the R.A.F. should, as a result of the end of the war in Europe, be able greatly to reinforce British aircraft resources in the Far East.

C. In our view, the case that can be made to General Wedemeyer for the allocation of the necessary air lift is a strong one.

He has already stated that, based upon the total resources available to the China Command, he is completing a plan for the conduct of the war in China which will cover both regular and irregular operations. He has, further, indicated both in Chungking and in Washington that he attaches a high importance to operations of an irregular character in China, holding the view that the Chinese are more fit for this type of activity than for regular military operations.

If he plans to have irregular operations carried out, this carries with it the intention of making such air lift available from the resources of the China Command as would



be needed to execute the operations he wishes to have done.

All that is left, therefore, is the question of to what special organization these irregular operations should be from time to time allocated. If there were in China a British special operational organization which we could reasonably claim was at least as efficient as the American or Sino-American organization already existing, it would surely not be unreasonable for the appropriate British authorities to press General Wedemeyer fairly strongly to allow a definite if limited portion of his irregular programme to be carried out by the British organization. China is, after all, not an exclusively American theatre. The legitimate interest of the British in China is great. As long, therefore, as the British have a reasonably efficient special organization in China (such as that suggested in our JIS(384/45) it seems to us that H.M.G. could reasonably object to the allocation of the whole of the irregular programme to O.S.S. and Commodore Miles's Navy Group.

One factor which ought not to be overlooked is that if the case is put to the China Command in this way there is a good deal of reason to suppose that, even if General Wedemeyer wished to refuse any operational role to the British, he would have some difficulty in forcing this recommendation upon the Generalissimo. There is little doubt that, entirely for their own reasons, the Chungking authorities are not anxious to see assistance to them in the war against Japan exclusively concentrated in American hands. Within the last two or three months, senior Chinese officials such as General Cheng Kai Min, the D.M.I., and General Pai Chung Hsi, the Deputy Chief of Staff, have gone out of their way to urge upon British representatives the desirability of British forces taking some part in the war against Japan. Although we know that General Wedemeyer has recommended to the Generalissimo against the original S.O.E. plan worked out with the Chinese D.M.I., we also know that the Generalissimo has refrained from making any decision and has not so far accepted the recommendation. In conveying this information to us within the last few months, General Cheng Kai Min stated most emphatically that he would like us to assure the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese Government favoured British participation in the war in China along such lines as were envisaged by the original project of which he was himself the principal sponsor.

6. The advantages which might reasonably be expected from an attempt to secure a role on the above lines for a British operational organization in China may be summarized as follows:-

- A. Given the extremely vulnerable character of the Japanese lines of communication in Southern China from Hengyang to Nanning and from Hengyang to Canton, it is not unreasonable to suggest that some definite military value can be attached to the encouragement of guerrilla activities which would interfere with these lines of communication and generally hamper the Japanese even under present conditions. In the event either of an Allied landing on the South East China Coast (whether in Kwangtung Province or in Fukien or Chekiang), which would involve substantial re-dispositions and re-concentrations by the Japanese, or in the event of a Japanese withdrawal north from the provinces in question, such guerrilla activities would gain increased importance. There is, in fact, no doubt at all that General Wedemeyer



intends to stimulate guerrilla action in this area. It is merely a question of trying to get him to allocate some of this work to a British organization.

B. The special reasons why it would be worth while for H.M.G. in its own interest to press for such an allocation are as follows:-

- (i) It is submitted that the attitude of H.M.G. in this matter may have a very considerable influence on Sino-British relations. The Chungking Government have made clear that they would welcome some British contribution to the war in China and they do not wish to be forced to put all their eggs into the American basket. It must be appreciated that what little is at present being done by British services in China is being done not for the Chinese or for China Command but for British authorities outside that theatre. The Chinese know well that the initial attempts of B.M.M. and S.O.E. to obtain some role in China have been unsympathetically received by General Wedemeyer and his American Headquarters. If no further attempt is made by the British to secure a role, if the initial rebuff is accepted and no steps taken to make a strong case to General Wedemeyer, then the Chinese are bound to feel that we have washed our hands of China and are content to see it become an exclusively American sphere of influence.
- (ii) H.M.G. are extremely interested in the recovery of Hong Kong. If Hong Kong is in fact liberated entirely without the participation of British forces, the problem of its recovery for the Empire may be complicated. If on the other hand a British operational organization can take an effective part on the lines sketched above in the organization and direction of resistance in the Kwangsi-Kwangtung Provinces, there is a very fair chance that British Officers may be in a position to protect and support British interests in Hong Kong. There are important elements in Free China, of whom General Pai Chung Hsi and Admiral Chan Chak are by no means the least, who, whatever may be their official utterances, would in fact much prefer Hong Kong to remain in British hands. If a British organization were working with these leaders and their following in Kwangsi-Kwangtung, and British officers were on the spot and in positions of confidence with leaders of Chinese irregular forces, from which they could influence events on the basis of directives received from the appropriate British authority, very useful work in the interests of H.M.G. might be done.

In setting out the above possible advantages, S.O.E. wish to make quite clear that they are not themselves presuming to recommend any policy to H.M.G. and are concerned only to set down what they consider would be the likely results of a given course of action.

As Lord Selborne has made clear in his minute to the Prime Minister, S.O.E. is merely anxious to be informed of the policy in accordance with which they should act.



ORGANISATION OF BRITISH SERVICES IN CHINA

PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY S.O.E.

I. The following proposals are based on the assumption that no change is likely to occur in the present character of the China Command. At the present time General Wedemeyer, in his capacity as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and acting with the latter's authority and approval, has assumed full direction and control of the activities of all special organisations, both British and American, in China. In fact, for practical purposes, at least as far as irregular operations are concerned, General Wedemeyer, with the Staff Officers he has appointed for the purpose, is the China Command.

He has made it absolutely clear that no operation of any kind can be carried out by any of the organisations concerned until it has been submitted for his approval and received his authority. No personnel or equipment of any kind can be brought into the China Theatre; no development of the organisations can take place, or personnel be moved about, without his approval. He is insisting upon being kept fully advised of all the equipment, down to minute details possessed by the special organisations. He insists upon receiving a weekly sitrep of all their activities on the basis of which he can give them day to day direction.

He has explained that it is his intention to allocate roles and approve operations for all special organisations, British and American, in accordance with the general plan he is working out for the conduct of war in China, both regular and irregular, and that he and the American Staff Officers appointed for this purpose will co-ordinate the activities of all the organisations concerned.

II. The proposals further take into account the present situation and prospects of the British operational organisations in China.

As far as S.O.E. itself is concerned, we are conducting no operations in China, and have been as yet allocated no role. Our activities are confined to carrying out certain services for the Chinese D.M.I. in Chungking and for B.A.A.G. (to whom we have also loaned personnel and equipment) and Force 136 S.E.A.C. at Kuming.

As regards the B.M.M., its field force has recently been withdrawn to India to refit. We understand it will not return to China unless and until allocated a role by General Wedemeyer.

B.A.A.G. continues to function, but under very considerable difficulties, and the big developments agreed last October by all concerned as being desirable in the work of this organisation have been hamstrung. It still has the two posts at Hoyuen (two officers) and at Yanping (two officers) which were in existence before their Lines of Communication were cut by the Japanese advance, and these two posts continue, as far as they can, their M.I.9 and M.I.19 work. No successful sorties to maintain them have so far taken place. As regards the scheme for putting in B.A.A.G. East to develop the work of this organisation southwards from Manchow, the advance party of seven officers and two O.Rs. has gone in and are now at Lungnan or moving east and south. The main B.A.A.G. East party have not yet moved because approval has not yet been obtained from General Wedemeyer to put it in. In the meantime, General Wedemeyer has authorized a number of sorties for the purpose of putting O.S.S. personnel into the same area in Kwantung.

The work of E. Group from Kuming, not being much dependent on the facilities over which General Wedemeyer has control, as far as we know continues fairly normally.

The position in regard to G.B.F. has a result of the developments in F.I.C. is unknown, but it is probable that this



organisation has ceased to function.

### III.

In the situation described in the above two paragraphs it seems to us apparent that, whatever we may conceive to be the problem with which we have to deal, it is certainly not the problem of the co-ordination of British Services because:-

- A. Co-ordination of the activities of British, as of American, organisations is already effected and will continue to be effected by General Wedemeyer and Brigadier-General Olmsted, on the lines indicated in paragraph I.
- B. There are virtually no British operations to be co-ordinated and it is unlikely that there will be any unless and until a role is allocated to British effort.

In our view, therefore, the fundamental problem is that of getting an operational role allocated to the British in China by the China Command - assuming always that it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that there should be some British operational contribution in the China Theatre.

We have therefore approached the question of the organisation of British Services in China from the point of view of the consideration of what form of organisation is most likely to assist in securing a reasonable operational role for British forces (forces which are necessarily of a para-military rather than a regular military character) in the war in China, and the most effective execution by them of such a role when allocated.

### IV.

On this basis we put forward the following proposals:-

1. There should be a pooling of all the resources in personnel and equipment, present and potential, of the existing operational organisations (namely, B.M.W., B.A.A.C., S.O.E. G.B.T., E.Group) so as to form a single British operational unit.
2. A Commander should be appointed to this unit with full authority to re-organise and re-allocate the resources placed at his disposal in whatever way seemed to him necessary in order to carry out the operational tasks assigned to him by the China Command.

The Commander would be appointed by the British Chiefs of Staff and it would be an essential feature of the scheme that he should be selected on the basis of his qualifications for the carrying out of the sort of operations likely to be allocated to the unit.

3. The proposed chain of command and the relationship of the Commander to all relevant authorities is set out in the attached chart. The following explanations should cover the main points:-

- (a) The Commander would be ultimately responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff but would be placed by them under the operational direction and control of the China Command, i.e. the Generalissimo, through his Chief of Staff, General Wedemeyer.
- (b) General Carton de Wiart.

General Carton de Wiart would have no direct authority or responsibility for the unit, but as the Prime Minister's Personal Representative would



be kept fully informed by the Commander of all major developments, problems, etc. so that he would be in a position both to advise the Commander, and to make recommendations on matters of policy back to London. He would also be available to give what assistance he thought desirable to the Commander by his personal intervention with General Wedemeyer, the Generalissimo or neighbouring Commanders, such as Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia and Commander in Chief, India.

(c) S.A.C.S.E.A.

The Commander and his unit would act as the agent of S.A.C.S.E.A. in regard to any operations which S.A.C. wished carried out in and through the China Theatre on behalf of his own Command - e.g. staging operations through China back into S.E.A. The procedure would be that S.A.C.S.E.A. (or the appropriate Department in S.E.A.C.) would request the Commander to carry out a given operation. The Commander would then clear the proposed operation with the China Command (parallel action to facilitate this being taken by S.A.C.S.E.A. to the China Command, if thought desirable) and, within the terms of the approval secured from the China Command, would carry out operations as directed by S.A.C.S.E.A.

(d) G.H.Q. India.

The Commander and his unit would act as agent for Commander in Chief, India for the carrying out of the M.I.9 and M.I.19 work in China at present being performed by D.A.A.G., E.Group and G.B.T.

The procedure would be in principle the same as in regard to S.A.C. G.H.Q. India would indicate its requirement to the Commander who would clear with the China Command, and, within the terms of the approval secured from the China Command, would carry out the operations as directed.

4. S.I.S. (G.L.O.)

It is fully appreciated that the position of S.I.S. in China is radically different from that of the organisations dealt with above in that S.I.S. is not an operational organisation and does not work, at any rate to any considerable extent, for the China Command.

It would seem to us therefore that S.I.S. should definitely not be included in an organisation intended to be placed at the disposal of the China Command and to receive its direction from that source.

It is true that S.I.S. is subject to the authority and control of the China Command in respect of certain of its administrative requirements - e.g. movement of its personnel and stores and the use of facilities over which the China Command has control. It is our impression, however, that this represents a very minor aspect of S.I.S. activity and that, as long as the China Command is kept properly informed and its approval secured for these aspects of S.I.S.'s work referred to above, there is no reason why it should not remain virtually an independent organisation in China working for, and on directives from, the several British authorities outside the China Theatre which it serves.

The position of S.I.S. is not shown in detail on the attached chart, but our view is that it would continue to be directed



exactly as at present, merely clearing such of its activities as from time to time appeared to be necessary with General Wedemeyer.

Our impression is that the exclusion of S.I.S. from the proposed unified operational organisation (and possibly a closer link with the Embassy) and the consequent emphasis upon its different, non-operational and largely non-military character, would considerably increase the chances of avoiding tiresome and even hostile interference from General Wedemeyer.

- V. We wish to put on record our view that, if it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that some operational role of a definite if limited character should be secured by the British in China, it will in our opinion not only be necessary to organise the British operational services in a form which will make them a useful instrument to the China Command, but also to give the resulting single organisation some additional logistical support from such resources as are available and ~~press its~~ ~~claims with some vigour upon General Wedemeyer.~~



Joint Chiefs of Staff

U.S. Theatre Commander  
(General Wedemeyer)

Generalissimo

Chief of Staff  
(General Wedemeyer)  
Co-ordinating Staff  
Officers.  
Brig.Gen. Olmsted

British Chiefs of Staff

Advice

P.M.

General Carton  
de Wiart

S.A.S.S.E.A.

C.H.Q. INDIA.

*Operational Direction & Control*

*Operational Direction & Control*

*Requests for Operations in China Theatre*

American Irregular  
Organisations

Unified British Operational  
Organisations pooling  
resources of present

S.I.S.

B.M.M.  
B.A.A.G.  
S.O.E.  
E.Group  
C.B.T.



# OUTWARD TELEGRAM

4  
Mr. C. E. J. Gent,  
Col. Office.

G U A R D

F. /G

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CHUNGKING

NO. 241

28th March, 1945.

D. 12.15 a.m. 29th March, 1945.

Repeated to Supreme Allied Command South East Asia No. 115  
(for Mr. Brain)  
Private Secretary to Governor-General, India,  
New Delhi.

V V V

MOST IMMEDIATE

GUARD

TOP SECRET

DEDIP

J.I.C. are considering urgently the question of clandestine and para-military organisations in China for a report to the Chiefs of Staff.

2. S.O.E. maintain that before the question of organisation can be settled it is essential to decide whether or not an attempt should be made to secure the allocation to the British of a rôle within the framework of the plans of the China Command for para-military activities in China. They suggest that if this policy is to be adopted the most effective organisation would be obtained by pooling the resources of S.O.E., B.M.M., and B.A.A.G. The object of this organisation would be to train equip and direct the operations of some 30,000 Chinese guerillas in the Kwangsi-Kwangtung area including Hong Kong. The primary aim would be to contain Japanese forces and to disrupt their communications. The ulterior aim would be to facilitate, at the appropriate moment, the re-establishment of British administration in Hong Kong. The organisation would also continue the existing functions of B.A.A.G. The existing activities of S.I.S., "E" Group and G.B.T. would not be affected by the form or organisation suggested by S.O.E.

3. The representative of the Commander-in-Chief India and the War Office are strongly opposed to the absorption of B.A.A.G. and the B.M.M. and to their participation in the proposed organisation. SACSEA's representative is also opposed to this project on logistical grounds dealt with later in this telegram. S.I.S., supported by Admiralty, are strongly opposed to extension of guerilla activities as they consider this would upset their coast-watching organisation.

4. If there are to be guerilla operations in the Kwangsi-Kwangtung area at all, it seems prima facie desirable that they should be under British direction. But the success of the policy

/contemplated



contemplated by S.O.E. would depend upon the agreement and continuous support of the Generalissimo and General Wedemeyer. It would also depend upon the provision by General Wedemeyer from his resources of the necessary air lift, since no air lift additional to that already being provided by the R.A.F. can be furnished by S.E.A.C. at any rate for some considerable time to come.

5. As regards the provision of air-lift S.A.C.'s representative believes that General Wedemeyer would draw on the American air resources now supporting operations in S.E.A.C. claiming, with the support of the United States Chiefs of Staff, that these resources were in fact at his disposal.

6. In order that the J.I.C. may be in a position to make definite recommendations to the Chiefs of Staff, I should be grateful if, in consultation with General Carton de Wiart, you would furnish your joint replies to the following questions, to reach me at latest by Sunday, 1st April.

7. (a) Do you consider the policy outline in paragraph 2 desirable from the point of view of the common war effort against Japan and of British interests and prestige in China?

(b) If the answer is yes, is it likely to have the agreement and continuous support of the Generalissimo and General Wedemeyer, bearing in mind that the ulterior aim, even though not communicated to them, might nevertheless become apparent?

(c) If either the Generalissimo or General Wedemeyer or both are likely to oppose the policy do you consider that they would be susceptible to pressure? If either or both consented under pressure do you consider that later they would be likely to withdraw support, or might even turn the policy to our disadvantage by diverting our activities from being of any use for the ulterior aim?

(d) Do you consider it safe to assume that if General Wedemeyer agrees to provide the necessary air lift he will not make extra calls upon the United States air resources of S.E.A.C. which he has the authority of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to do?

(e) If you agree with the proposed policy do you agree with the pooling of the resources of B.M.M., B.A.A.G. and S.O.E. for the purpose outlined above, or do you agree with India and War Office view in paragraph 3?

(f) Do you consider that by proposing this policy there is any danger of prejudicing the British activities in China now sanctioned by the Generalissimo?

O.T.P.



repeated SEAC  
Gov Gen India

Gray

Registry  
No.

FOREIGN OFFICE,  
S.W.1.

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Despatched

M

Draft.  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Chungking.

DEDIP

March, 1945.

Telegram.

No.....

O.T.P.

J.I.C. are considering urgently for submission of a report to the Chiefs of Staff the question of clandestine and para-military organisations in China.

2. In the course of their discussions S.O.E.

[have put forward a proposal for the concentration of our para-military effort in a single organisation to operate in Kwangtung only as part of a general plan of widespread guerrilla

activities in China understood to have been

formulated by General Wedemeyer. This organisation

would pool the resources of S.O.E., B.M.M. and

B.A.A.G. Its purpose would be to train, equip and

direct the operations of some 30,000 Chinese

guerrillas in the ~~Kwangsi-Kwangtung~~ <sup>including HK</sup> area. The primary

object would be to contain Japanese forces and

to disrupt their communications together with the

ultimate aim of [influencing and] facilitating

as far as possible the return of Hong Kong to

Great Britain.

3. The Government of India and the War Office

are opposed to the absorption of B.A.A.G. and to

any derogation of its functions. The existing

activities of S.I.S., E. Group and G.B.T. would

not be affected by the S.O.E. plan.

Copy to:-

Sec., J.I.C.,

Directors of

Intelligence.

The organs in SEAC also contain the B.A.A.G. ~~work~~

SAC SEAC

H.M. Ambassador

also

From the Colonial Office that certain personnel of B.A.A.G. will

form of organs? supported by SOE

but SIS, supported by Army,

permanent arrangements can be made



4. <sup>Kwangsi-</sup> If there are to be guerrilla operations in the Kwangtung area at all it seems prima facie desirable that they should be under British direction. But the success of the <sup>policy</sup> ~~organisation~~ as contemplated by S.O.E. would depend upon the agreement and continuous support of the Generalissimo and General Wedemeyer. It would also depend upon the provision by General Wedemeyer from his resources of the necessary air lift, since no air lift additional to that already being provided by the R.A.F. can be furnished by SEAC at any rate for some considerable time to come.

A 1

S.A.C. Hpr says pt  
~~At A~~  
w. mean W  
taking American  
in resources from  
SEAC for impulse

5. In order that the J.I.C. may be in a position to make definite recommendations to the Chiefs of Staff, I should be grateful if, in consultation with General Carton de Wiart, you would furnish your joint replies to the following questions to reach me at latest by Sunday, 1st April.

para 2

6. (a) Do you consider the <sup>policy outlined in</sup> ~~S.O.E. plan~~ desirable from the point of view of the common war effort against Japan and of British interests and prestige in China?

(b) If the answer is yes, is it likely to have the agreement and continuous support of the Generalissimo and General Wedemeyer, bearing in mind that the ulterior aim, <sup>although</sup> ~~even if~~ <sup>even if</sup> not communicated to them, might nevertheless become apparent?

✓ (C)



3.

(c) If either the Generalissimo or General Wedemeyer or both <sup>are likely to</sup> oppose the <sup>policy</sup> scheme, do you consider that they would be susceptible to pressure? *If either or both consented in the presence*

(d) Do you consider it safe to assume <sup>do you consider</sup> that if General Wedemeyer agrees to provide the <sup>that they</sup> necessary air lift he will not make extra calls <sup>or later be</sup> upon the United States air resources of SEAC <sup>likely to</sup> which he has the authority of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to do <sup>or even</sup> in order to meet <sup>do not policy</sup> ~~the~~ S.O.E. requirements <sup>to our disadvantage</sup> ~~of the proposed policy?~~ <sup>by diverting</sup>

(e) Do you favour the amalgamation of B.M.M. and B.A.A.G. with S.O.E. for the purpose <sup>activities from</sup> outlined above or do you agree with India and <sup>any of any</sup> War Office view in paragraph 3? <sup>was for the</sup> <sup>retention of</sup>

*If you are in favour of policy, do you agree with pooling of organisations in para 2 or ~~the~~ alternatively with continuing news in para 3.*

*(f) Will this pooling, if desirable, prejudice Generalissimo's sanction for present Brit organisations in China.*



THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT  
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT  
UNDER SECTION (4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958.

J1C (45) 105 (0) Final  
28 March 1945



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UNDER SECTION (4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958.

JIC /372/45

23 March 1945



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UNDER SECTION (4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958.

JIC /384/ 45

25 March 1945



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ACT 1958.

JIC /385/45

25 March 1945



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JIC /395/45

27 March 1945



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JIC / 396 / 45

27 March 1945



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27 March 1945



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27 March 1945



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ACT 1958.

J1c/412/45

29 March 1945



G U A R D

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.FROM CHUNGKING TO FOREIGN OFFICESir H. Seymour  
No. 315D. 12.58. p.m. 30th March 1945  
(G.M.T.)

30th March 1945

R. 2.40. p.m. 30th March 1945  
(B.S.T.)Repeated to S.A.C.S.E.A. (For Brain),  
Government of India (for Private Secretary to  
Viceroy).

8 8 8 8

IMMEDIATEDEDIPGUARDTOP SECRET

[Ref. omitted ? Your telegram No. 241].

Following represents agreed views of General Carton de  
Wiart and myself.

2. We agree that objective of organisations in China should be settled but we do not agree that British Military Mission and B.A.A.G. should come under S.O.E. In our view S.O.E. should come under the control of General Officer Commanding British Military Mission.

3. The proposed operation is a large one to be undertaken in China. If force were properly used it would obviously be of value but you will realise that control of any guerilla force of the size contemplated will be very difficult.

4. Wedemeyer has told Carton de Wiart that he intended to use all air lifts he has or could get to equip his regular forces. We think that if he can draw on American aircraft from S.E.A.C. he will do so for his own forces.

5. Replies to questions in your paragraph 7 are as follows:

(a) See paragraph 3 above. We think that arming so large a force as a first attempt is too risky and would prefer to see a less ambitious scheme to gain experience.

(b) We think that the Generalissimo would agree if we consider the effort worth while. We do not think that his support would continue when purpose of establishing ourselves in Hong-Kong became obvious. Wedemeyer would not

/ support ....



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JIC /428 /45

1<sup>st</sup> April 1945



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Jic (45) III (D) (Draft)

2 April 1945



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ACT 1958.

Jrc (45) 111 (0) Final

3 April 1945



# OUTWARD TELEGRAM

18

Mr. Genl  
Colonial Office

G U A R D

F /G

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CHUNGKING

No. 248

D. 7.50 p.m. 2nd April, 1945.

2nd April, 1945.

Repeated to Supreme Allied Command S.E. Asia No. 121  
(for Mr. Brain),  
Private Secretary to Governor-General India  
(New Delhi) No.

/////

IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

DEDIP

GUARD



? Your telegram No. 315 [of March 30th].

For purposes of record and to guard against any misunderstanding S.O.E. wish us to point out that they have never proposed that the British Military Mission and/or B.A.A.G. should come under S.O.E. What they suggested was that the resources of all three agencies should be pooled to form a single operational organisation to be set up under a commander to be appointed by the Chiefs of Staff.

2. We are assuming that this makes no difference to the views expressed by you in your paragraph 5 (e) as to the future organisation of B.M.M. and B.A.A.G.

O.T.P.



19

G U A R D

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM CHUNGKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Seymour, D. 1.54 p.m. GMT April 4th, 1945.

No. 327

April 4th, 1945. R. 4.40 p.m. DBST April 4th, 1945.

Repeated to Supreme Allied Command South East Asia (for Brain)  
and Government of India (for Private Secretary to the  
Viceroy)

Q Q Q


DEDIP

Top Secret.

Guard.

18

Your telegram No. 248.



We confirm that we are not in favour of the pooling of all resources but having seen Mackenzie wish to elaborate paragraph 5 (a) of my telegram No. 315.

2. Mackenzie informs us that for a modified Kuangsi-Kuantung scheme an exploratory period of three to four months would be required for establishing initial contacts, setting up wireless telegraphy communications, and deciding what elements are to be armed and under what conditions. During this period the demand on air lifts would be small, and could be met if so ex gratia out of sorties which inevitably become available from time to time in SACSEA special duty squadrons programme.

3. After the first three to four months we assume that air lift situation might have been considerably eased.

4. In any case, it is clear that a scheme on these lines, which should have definite value in relation to Hongkong, is one which goes nearest to meeting General Wedemeyer's objections on the ground of shortage of available air lifts. If Wedemeyer should reject it, it would show clearly that no British paramilitary activity of any size will be willingly accepted by him.

5. This scheme would envisage even closer collaboration than at present exists between S.O.E and B.N.A.G. Colonel Ride has expressed willingness to command the next A.E. China for such a scheme. Director of Military Intelligence India has already agreed to this appointment once S.O.E. operational rôle has been definitely approved.

6./.....



whether you are prepared to support such a scheme, and to what degree we should press it if General Wedemeyer will not recommend it to Chiang-Kai-Shek.

7. We consider that the only alternative for S.O.E. to something on these lines would be the withdrawal of Force 136 from the theatre.

- 2 -

6. We should be grateful for expression of opinion whether you are prepared to support such a scheme, and to what degree we should press it if General Wedemeyer will not recommend it to Chiang-Kai-Shek.

7. We consider that the only alternative for S.O.E. to something on these lines would be the withdrawal of Force 136 from the theatre.

- 2 -

OTF

whether you are prepared to support such a scheme, and to what degree we should press it if General Wedemeyer will not recommend it to Chiang-Kai-Shek.

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- 2 -

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- 2 -

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7. We consider that the only alternative for S.O.E. to something on these lines would be the withdrawal of Force 136 from the theatre.



COPY

10. DOWNING STREET,  
WHITEHALL.

April 5, 1945.

TOP SECRET

My dear Lawford,

1 On 15th March Lord Selborne sent the Prime Minister a minute on the role of S.O.E. in the Far East, copies being sent to the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. Mr. Churchill sent Mr. Eden his comments on this on 18th March.

(2) We have now received a minute from the Secretary of State for the Colonies saying that he attaches great importance to S.O.E. retaining a recognised role in South China and Borneo. A copy of this minute, which is dated 21st March, was sent to Mr. Eden. The Prime Minister has referred Colonel Stanley's minute to the Chiefs of Staff Committee to whom I am therefore also sending a copy of Lord Selborne's minute of 15th March. No doubt when replying to the note which the Prime Minister addressed to Mr. Eden on 18th March, after reading Lord Selborne's minute, you will take into consideration the Colonial Office view and the fact that the matter has now been referred to the Chiefs of Staff also. I am sending copies of this letter to Thornley and McEwan.

Yours ever,

(Sgd)

J.R. COLVILLE.

V.G. Lawford, Esq.,  
Foreign Office.





C.H. Thornley, Esq.,  
Colonial Office.

With Mr. J.R. Colville's  
Compliments.

10 Downing Street,  
Whitehall, S.W. 1.  
April 5, 1945.



## 21

(Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased.)

Desp. 162320 Apr. 45.  
DTO 161718B

SD2/6617

TOP SECRET

7

SECOND. On receipt above paper signal earliest your proposals for War Establishment incl transport of staff of GOC British troops in CHINA. As there is to be no increase in manpower allotment you should show what compensating reductions can be made in **present** establishments of British organisations in CHINA.

Copies to :-

MS  
DMS(A)  
ACIGS(O)  
DMO  
DDMO(A)(B)  
MO 1, 1 S/P 12  
DMI  
DDMI(I) (P) (O&S) (PW)  
MI 1 2 6 9 19 17  
DSD  
DDSD(A)(B)(C)  
SD 1 2(10) 3 4 5  
Maj-Gen Cawthorn (c/o MI 2)  
A.V.M. Whitworth Jones (Air Min)

Sec JIC (2)  
Gen. Sir Stewart Menzies  
Admiralty (INI)  
Colonial Office (Mr. Gent)  
India Office (Brig. Reynolds)  
Defence Office  
Air Ministry (ACAS(I))  
Gen Gubbins  
Foreign Office (Mr. Sterndale-Bennett)  
(Mr. Cavendish-Bentinck)



**TOP SECRET**

Capt. Secretariat  
Clarks.

*W! Gent - 22*

17 APR 1945 FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(P 3213/88/G)

14th April, 1945.

TOP SECRET.

With the Compliments  
of the  
Under Secretary of  
for Foreign Affairs

*C411 Kornley Esq.*

*My Dear Colville*  
S.O.E. in the Far East.

1  
X  
X  
Since the Prime Minister asked for the Foreign Secretary's views on Lord Selborne's minute of the 15th March, the whole question of S.O.E. activities in China has been exhaustively considered by the Chiefs of Staff organisation in consultation with all concerned. You will have seen the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff at their 88th meeting on the 5th April (Item 20) and the Foreign Office agree with those conclusions.

(2)  
Lord Selborne's minute dealt also with activities in Borneo. This aspect of the question has been covered by the Colonial Secretary in his minute of the 21st March and no Foreign Office point appears to arise on it at present.

A minute to this effect had been prepared for the Secretary of State's signature but Mr. Eden was unable to sign it before his departure yesterday for Washington. In order to avoid further delay I have therefore been asked to write to you as above in reply to your letter of the 5th April.

/1

J.R. Colville, Esq.,  
10, Downing Street,  
S.W.1.



I am sending copies of this letter to Thornley,  
Miss M.P. Hornsby-Smith and General Hollis.

Yours ever,

Sgt) J. M. Henderson.

for (V.G. Lawford)



23

**MOST SECRET**  
**CIPHER TELEGRAM**

312394

This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased.  
(Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

Recd. 212145 Apr 45.

From: MA Chungking.

D.T.O. 211230G.

To: War Office.  
Info: Sacsea.  
C. in C. India.  
Adv Alfsea.

IMMEDIATE

MO773 cipher 21 April. TOP SECRET.

1. Ref 85767 (SD2b) of 16 April and JIC45 111 O. Please note following factual amendments to latter.

A. Para 2a while Missions establishment is 139 all ranks ceiling has been fixed at 95 all ranks.

B. Para 13. It is as Commander 204 Mission that I am a general officer and not as MA of China the established rank is Brigadier.

2. In interests economy manpower and material, in view radical improvement American attitude BAAG and E Gp and as result of personal visit to all British tps at Kunming must suggest organisation for British tps China differing in detail but not in principle from that approved in appendix one to JIC. Paper

3. BTC to be organised in gps as under and all to be directly under command operational control or control for coordination as the case may be of GOC whose HQ should be based on that of present BMM the title 204 Mission being abolished altogether.

A. 1. British training group under Jacobs Larkcom with a small HQ staff size dependent on role to be undertaken which is still under discussion with Chinese and Americans. At present concentrated/



2.

concentrated Kunming but may move anywhere.

B. 2 British training gp. under Lt Col Annand consisting of 4 officers and one BOR. Remnants of Pucheng school left in eastern China to maintain connexion there. This group must be run from Chungking. Not through Larkcom.

C. BAA group under Ride.

D. E Group into which GBT group is to be absorbed requires a Lieut Col to command it presumably to be found by India.

E. Signals and cipher group. Signal situation here most unsatisfactory and uneconomical. Main military link Kunming provided by RAF although over 80 percent traffic is military. BAAG signals provided in part by SOE and therefore outside my control. Centralisation of all signals under Major R. Signals essential in my opinion for proper and economical working.

F. Base and L of C group. Under Lieut Col. Present situation unsatisfactory and have just been compelled to remove a field officer of Mission in Kunming from command and send him out of China owing to Chinese complaints which unfortunately have some foundation of connivance by British personnel at smuggling activities of Chinese employees of BMM. Have placed Jacobs Larkcom temporarily in command there but I must have responsible senior officer in this key position daily becoming more difficult in view shortage of petrol and alcohol for convoys up country. Further this group if properly organised should be able to relieve BAA group and E group of a great many of their administration problems and economise in personnel.

G. ISLD and SOE Group. Discipline and coordination only. Both of which would be far simpler had the former an overall controller in China.

4. Coordination now far simpler problem than seemed possible/



3.

possible a month ago, and no reason why coordination officer vide appendix one should not carry out all duties senior general staff officer to GOC. A Colonel is required since he will virtually command BTC in absence of GOC who will have vast distances to cover. In addition coordinator will have to deal on high level with HQ USF here. 2 second and 2 third grade officers total 4 also required on general staff 2 for training and Signal groups and 2 for remainder. Above numbers essential in view high sickness rate here tending to increase.

5. Administrative Staff. Experienced AA and QMG urgently required in view mounting difficulties in connection with and transport accommodation financial questions and the like. One DAA/QMG and one DAAG with financial experience since millions of dollars now involved. 2 staff captains are also essential.

6. Other officers. DADMS and 1 capt RAMC 1 subaltern ADC to GOC if possible a Chinese speaker to travel with latter 1 subaltern camp commandant and 2 junior commanders FANY.

7. WOs and sgts. 1 WO class 2 2 RQMS 1 sgt clerk 1 transport sgt 1 sgt RAPC and 1 staff sgt RAMC.

8. Rank and file/<sup>clerks</sup> 4 corporals 2 lance corporals. Storeman one lance corporal. Nursing orderly 1 corporal.

9. Above proposals represent increase of 5 officers and 3 other ranks over present HQ establishments less Intelligence Section of mission but considered bare minimum. No difficulty in meeting these and other commitments in the present establishment BMM BAAG E Group. But present low ceiling of BMM must (repeat must) be raised the extent depending on the economies I hope to /effect.....



effect as a result of the greater degree of centralisation which this plan envisages.

10. No record here of how Intelligence Section BMM of 1 first grade 1 second grade and 1 Intelligence officer came into being but understand was arranged in London by my predecessor in order to regularise the position in China of Col. Stables and to utilise his special knowledge. Thus two British Intelligence Organisations exist in China which is most unsatisfactory. Actually the 2 junior vacancies have never been filled due to lack of qualified candidates and Stables works exclusively in MA office. But see Troopers signal 86395(MT2) of 19 April para 2. Under new organisation this proposal which am anxious to accept involved re establishment of Mission I section with all its disadvantages. Either GOC or MA must control Intelligence. Ideal solution would be absorption of MA staff as I section of new BTC in which case Stables should retain his present appointment and I section of BAAG should be transferred en block to HQ BTC. 2 or more junior officers would be saved the appointment of MA need not be filled and the appearance of a further senior officer would be avoided in a country where our effort is unfortunately so puny vis a vis that of the Americans. They still retain MA here but I have just heard HE and staff have been incorporated in American (?theatre) HQ. Foreign Office will doubtless be consulted on this proposal.

11. Transport. Staff cars 4 or 6 seater 2 station wagons 2 15 cwt 4X4 2 3 ton 4X4 2 jeeps (quarter ton) 4X4 4.

/12.....



12. You should see Embassy telegrams number 357 of 11 April and number 379. Of 17 April to Foreign Office also despatches numbers 411(1/13B/45) of 12 April and 425(2/13B/45) of 12 April. Copies of last two will be forwarded by next bag. In drafting above I have these proposals in mind and see no reason why staff required should not be fitted in to organisation now proposed.

13. Would emphasise that these proposals represent a simple and logical organisation to replace present jumble and will be understood by and acceptable to both the Chinese and the Americans.

14. HM Ambassador and General Carton De Wiart agree these proposals including that in para 10 above.

C.6.(Telegrams)

To: S.D. 2b (for action)  
Copies to:

M. S.	
DMS (a)	
M.S. 1	
AGIGS (O)	India Office Brig.Reynolds.
DMO	Defence Office
DDMO (a)(b)	Air Ministry (ACAS (I))
MO.1.1(SP).12	Gen Gubbins
BMI	Foreign Office Mr.Sterndale Bennett.
DDMI (I) (P) (O &S) (PW)	Mr. Cavendish Bentinck.
MI.1.2.6.9.17.19.	
DSD	D of O
DDSD(a)(b)(c)	D M P
SD 1.2(10).3.4.5.	Brig. AG Co ord.
Maj.Gen. Cawthorn (c/o MI2)	
Air Ministry (AVM Whitworth Jones)	
Sec JIC (2)	
Gen Sir Stewart Menzies	VQMG
Admiralty (DNI)	Brig.Q.Ops.
Colonial Office Mr. Gent.	DF (a)



m P. K. 114

**TOP SECRET**  
**CIPHER TELEGRAM**

Desn 290315 May 45

DFO 281830B

From:- The War Office

To:- This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased.

Info:- SACSEA (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased.)

C in C India

Adv ALFSEA

96994 cipher SD 2b 28 May

TOP SECRET

23

Your MO 773 cipher 21 Apr.

FIRST. Your proposals for fm HQ Brit Tps in China involving abolition of title 204 Mil Mission agreed in principle. System of comd and coord your para third approved but emphasise your responsibility for activities of SOE and ISLD is confined to coord.

SECOND. Your para Tenth. Incorporation of Int Staff from MA's office and from BAAG into HQ BTC agreed but decision whether appt of MA need be filled rests with Foreign Office. We are discussing with them and will inform you.

THIRD. Your para ninth. We agree to increase by 5 Offrs 3 OR manpower allotment of 204 Mil Mission making revised allotment 61 Offrs 42 OR.

FOURTH. Further cable follows on ranks and appts your paras fourth to eighth

C.6.(Tels)

Copies to :-

MS	VQMG
DMS(A)	Brig Q(Ops)
MS 1	DF(a)
ACIGS(O)	Maj Gen Cawthorn (c/o MI 2)
DMO	Air Min (AVM Whitworth Jones)
DDMO(A)(B)	Sec JIC (2)
MO 1 1(SP) 12	Gen Sir Stewart Menzies
DMI	Admiralty (DNI)
DDMI(I)(P)(O&S)(PW)	Colonial Office (Mr Gent)
MI 1 2 6 9 17 19	India Office (Brig Reynolds)
DSD	Defence Office
DDSD(A)(B)(C)	Air Min (ACAS(I) )
SD 1 2(20) 3 4 5	Gen Gubbins
D of O	Foreign Office
DMP	(Mr Strendale Bennett)
Brig AG Coord	(Mr. Cavendish Bentinck)

**RECEIVED**

**2 JUN 1945**

**Q. O. REGY**



D40/2 M Packin (P) MacDargall 28 W6  
331930  
to secy

**CIPHER TELEGRAM**

This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

Recd. 161740 Jul 45.

From:- BMM Chungking

D.T.O. 161100 H

To:- Adv Alfsea (for CSO).

Info:- War Office  
Sacsea

21 JUL 1945

C. O. REGY

O/0040 cipher 16 Jul. SECRET

One. 204 Military Mission now being absorbed in British Troops China and title 204 Mission being abolished. New organisation which comes into being 1 August 45 consists of HQ BTC and Eight groups which include all military organisations in China details of proposed new organisation were forwarded in my NMS/21 22 June 45.

Two. HQ BTC includes Intelligence Section/and MA staff and will be channel for all Military Intelligence previously handled by these staffs.

Three. Telegraphic address Britchin will cover HQ BTC for all traffic including Intelligence.

Four. Please arrange effective from 1 August registration of Britchin and cancellation of Britmis. Telegraphic address Machin will only cover traffic for Gen Carton de Wiart.

Five. Army W/T call sign WLZL (or WLZK) will continue to cover all traffic from Britchin and Machin as well as traffic for air and Naval attaches. Present combined Cipher Office will continue to function for all these parties on Chungking.

Six. Essential all signals and correspondence correctly addressed to avoid confusion and delay in

/clearance.



clearance.

Seven. Introduction of Britchin will necessitate advice by you or Troopers to all theatres and commands of whole (repeat whole) foregoing paras. P and T authorities in Chungking will be notified by this HQ.

Eight. Please advise all action this matter to this HQ.

C.6.Telegrams. Distribution by M.O.12. Sigs 7

Copies to: M.O.12. (action paras 1.6.7.8.)  
M.I.17. (action para 2.  
R.Central (action paras 3.4)  
Sigs 7a (action para 5)

Copies to: A.C.I.G.S(O)  
D.M.O.  
D.D.M.O.(A)(B)  
M.O.1.1(SP.12(3).  
D.M.I.  
D.D.M.I.(I)(O)(F)(P/W)  
M.I.2.6.9.17.(3)  
C.A.1.  
S.D.1c.  
D.D.Sigs (O)(Tels)  
Sigs.6.7.7a.7b Coord  
Comd. Gp. WO Sigs  
C.6.Tels.  
Foreign Office(Mr Sterndale Bennett)  
Colonial Office  
India Office (Brig Raynold)  
R.Central

Sigs 7a Note:- It is suspected that the wireless call-sign mentioned in para five should read WLZA. This is being queried with Chungking.



TOP SECRET.

1 Col. Taylor → 19/3/45  
Sir G. Gater.  
Secretary of State.

The S.O.E. Organisation keeps closely in touch with me in respect of their activities and operations in the Far East, and Colonel Taylor, a Senior Member of their London Office, has recently come back from a prolonged tour in India and China where there were recently important conferences between representatives of the British and United States clandestine organisations and the American and British Military Commanders.

The British S.O.E. operations in S.E.A.C. territories, including Malaya, are smooth sailing and have achieved an advanced stage. In Hong Kong and Borneo, however, they are outside a British operational sphere, and their position is more delicate.

In Borneo, however, they have a close working agreement with S.O.A., which is the Australian counterpart. This position is facilitated by the fact that General MacArthur himself has something of a dislike of the American organisation O.S.S., and prefers to use an ad hoc para-military organisation of his own in the operational areas of S.W.P. Command in which he is interested, viz. the Philippines, thus allowing S.O.A. a pretty clear field in Borneo, of which they have taken every advantage.

In Hong Kong there has admittedly been an unco-ordinated collection of activities by various British, U.S. and Chinese organisations, none of them very effective with the exception of B.A.A.G., which was originally organised from Hong Kong as a British organisation to

facilitate



facilitate escapes from Hong Kong. It has later developed into a British Group made use of by M.I.6 for Intelligence purposes, and by S.O.E. for clandestine operational purposes. The Japanese successes in South China last autumn considerably disturbed its habitat, but it is still there though somewhat disrupted.

General Wedemeyer, on his appointment in China vice General Stillwell, surveyed this mixed and unco-ordinated collection of United Nations para-military activities in China, and is intent on tidying it up. He has decided that none shall be allowed to operate in China except with his approval and with a definite operational role approved by himself, and he has stated that in his capacity as Chief of Staff to General Chiang Kai Shek he will not approve any activities which would, in his opinion, be obnoxious to the Generalissimo. Although B.A.A.G. and S.O.E. have functioned in China with the knowledge of the Generalissimo, it would not be claimed to be the case that his approval has been obtained for all their objects.

B. In order to constitute a single and substantial British para-military organisation in China, following General Wedemeyer's decision, S.O.E. proposed, and D.M.I. India were at first agreeable, that S.O.E. and B.A.A.G. should be combined and subjected to a single direction, since they felt that on that basis they could put in a claim to General Wedemeyer that they were a substantial force and worthy to be allotted an operational role in South China. The British Military Attaché at Chungking, however, who is technically the Commanding Officer of British forces in China, including B.A.A.G., has successfully objected to the S.O.E. proposal on the grounds that B.A.A.G. is the only British force in China which has any reputation, and that it would be likely to lose that reputation if it were amalgamated with S.O.E. This view has impressed the D.M.I. India, and ~~they have~~ <sup>he has</sup> now come

round



round to share it.

The Colonial Office has a major interest in the promotion of a recognised British military force both in Borneo and in South China. We have no operational forces of an ordinary sort in either theatre, and we therefore have to rely on para-military forces to show our flag in connection with the liberation of Borneo and Hong Kong.

54144/7.

As the Secretary of State knows, we were relying on the personnel and organisation of B.A.A.G. in particular under a scheme to forestall any Chinese Warlord snatching Hong Kong in any interval of Japanese weakness or evacuation before a United Nations military force of recognised character arrived to occupy the Colony. That scheme has been held up owing to the present doubt of the British position resulting from General Wedemeyer's edict. In any case, that scheme would be an impossible one to disclose to the Generalissimo, and it would therefore need to be a plain S.O.E. scheme organised from India for the conveyance at the crucial moment such B.A.A.G. or other British personnel as can be lifted into Hong Kong when the moment occurred.

*experience hitherto suggests that*  
Our ~~principle liberation~~ intelligence of conditions in Borneo and Hong Kong will depend entirely on our having a British (or Australian) organisation for the purpose.

A | For these reasons it would be a calamity if we failed to give our strongest support to the S.O.E. scheme to have a recognised role in areas suitable for *their* activities, in ~~Hong Kong~~ *S. China* especially, and

in



in Borneo in association with S.O.A.

S. J. Grant  
19.3.45.

S. J. S.

I am in agreement with "A" at the end of Mr. Grant's minute. May we prepare a draft note for you to send to the Prime Minister pointing out the Colonial Office's stance in the matter? A copy of the note could go to Lord Selborne.

As regards the domestic dispute between S.O.E. and A.A.A.G. Mr. Grant tells me that we must rely upon S.O.E. to handle negotiations with the Americans, but this difficulty does not call for any comment from us at this stage, as it does not arise in Lord Selborne's minute to the Prime Minister.

19.3. 747



1 agm.

om

19/3

21/3/45

2 To Prime Minister

106 23/3 } to see.  
R.T.B 24/3 }  
H. Bates  
H. Bowdell  
Miss Ruster

K.R.  
22/3.



TOP SECRET

S.O.E. Position in China

Following upon the Secretary of State's minute to the Prime Minister of 21st March the latter is now waiting for something from Mr. Eden on the subject.

In the meantime the J.I.C. and the Joint Planning Staff, in consultation together, have been spending their time discussing draft proposals from S.E.A.C. for a suitable organisation of British clandestine agencies in China based on the conception that these will not be "operational", but solely concerned with intelligence (S.I.S.) and escapes (B.A.A.G.). After some concentrated discussion on this, Mr. Cavendish Bentinck, the Chairman of the J.I.C., yesterday came to the decision that the first thing in fact for settlement was the wider question of what was to be the precise rôle of the British agencies (i.e. whether including an "operational" rôle) on which the organisation was to be based.

The expectation now is that the Prime Minister on receiving Mr. Eden's views is likely either to decide himself that there is no cause for the British to claim an operational rôle in China, or else to refer to the Chiefs of Staff that question and the additional one of how far, if desirable, it would be practicable. The Chiefs of Staff would then turn the J.I.C. and the J.P.S. on to the task of making an appreciation of the problems.

The



The Colonial Office interest in the issue is of course that without an operational rôle a British organisation would have virtually no equipment to facilitate our people being in the right place at the right time to make possible our emergency scheme for a British administration of Hong Kong. If we were given an operational rôle by General Wedemeyer, however, commensurate with the personnel and contacts which we can contribute in Kwangtung and Kwangsi (much superior to anything possessed by the American O.S.S.) we should claim, and with good prospect of success I understand, to be provided with such aircraft ~~especially~~ and other means of transport as were necessary for the rôle allotted to us. And our main need at the time will be transport resources, which will not be forthcoming if we have only an "intelligence" rôle.

A | If the Secretary of State approves, I suggest that Colonel Chalmers or I myself should find an opportunity in the next day or two to put these views into the minds of Mr. Cavendish Bentinck and the Planners.

*Sp. G. G. G.*

26. 3. 45.

Sq. S.

*I see every advantage in action as proposed at "A". Do you approve?*

*JS*

*27.3.*

*sm 27/3*



3. Col Taylor - 27/3/45  
 4. Tel 241 From F.O. 6  
 Chungking 29/3/45

I spent yesterday morning and evening with the J.I.C. and others on this question and the result was No.4. There is to be a further meeting on Monday at 10.30 with the object of having a paper prepared for the Chiefs of Staff later in the week.

There was fairly general opposition on the part of the War Office, (S.I.S.), and S.A.C., S.E.A's representative to what they persisted in calling the "S.O.E. scheme" and there was obviously a good deal of Departmental clanism and jealousy behind the attitude of these critics, as well as a certain amount of genuine doubts whether a policy of thrusting in a claim, as in paragraph 2 of No.4, for a British "operational" rôle in South China would have the least chance of success.

I shall want these papers first thing on Monday morning and in the meantime Mr. K. Robinson should see.

Mr. Bates


1/26  
 20/3

*See. Gen.*  
 29. 3. 45.

5	J.I.C.(45) 105 (0) Final	28/3/45
6	J.I.C. /372/45	23/3/45
7	J.I.C. /384/45	25/3/45
8	J.I.C. /385/45	25/3/45
9	J.I.C. /395/45	27/3/45



10	J.I.C	396/45	_____	27/3/45
11	J.I.C	397/45	_____	27/3/45
12	J.I.C	399/45	_____	27/3/45
13	J.I.C	412/45	_____	29/3/45
14	Del 315	from Chungking	_____	30/3/45
15	J.I.C	428/45	_____	1/4/45
16	J.I.C.	(45) III (0) aft	_____	2/4/45





D/44/3

16

As a result of several meetings of the J.I.C. and Planners culminating in a meeting during most of the day yesterday, the attached report on the S.O.E. proposal for a British para-military operational rôle in China has been hammered out.

There was an obvious resistance movement to S.O.E. "aggression" on the part of other Service interests, e.g.

a. the War Office intent on preserving their authority over the present British organisations in China, B.A.A.G., 204 Military Mission, etc.;

b. the S.E.A.C. representatives intent on discouraging any British action in China which was likely to draw on the very limited air transport resources for S.E.A.C's own campaign in Burma;

c. the S.I.S. and Navy anxious to discourage any para-military operations which were likely to disturb the conditions in ~~the~~ Chinese coastal countryside in which they are operating coast-watching posts;

d. finally, the Foreign Office and the Planners anxious to avoid any irritants between ourselves and General Wedemeyer in the Chinese theatre.

The result looked like being a complete turning down of <sup>any</sup> British operational rôle in China but that was avoided in the last stage: and although the conclusion was that in our present state of dependence on Americans for our essential air transport services, both for S.E.A.C. and supplies to existing British organisations in China (including "comforts" for the Embassy itself), it was quite impracticable to propose the enlargement of the British rôle in China while these conditions last. But that as soon as the port of Rangoon could be opened



opened to S.E.A.C. operations these limiting conditions might be modified and the project should be re-examined.

My own plea throughout the meeting was for a strengthening as soon as possible and by any means, of the British influence and prestige in South China, and if the S.O.E. proposal or any other alternative contributed to this, the Colonial Office would be in favour of it. The Committee agreed to make special mention (paragraph 9 of the report) of the great importance from the British political point of view of maintaining our position in respect of Hong Kong.

The report now goes to the Chiefs of Staff and is intended to serve them in the nature of a brief for their imminent talks with the American General Hurley.

(As soon as Mr. MacDougall is back I should like this paper to be recirculated to me to be shown to him.)

*Settled*

3. 4. 45.

*7.9.45*  
*K.S.*  
*Mr. K. Robinson*  
*K. Baker*  
*M. Packer*  
*Col. Chalmers*  
*3/4*  
*Min. Packer (on return)*  
*7/4*  
*6/4*

*17 J.I.C. (45) III (O) Final* 3/4/45

*Mr. Coad* *Mr. MacDougall* *have*  
*seen* *of* *recommendations* *are*  
*accepted* *by* *the* *Chiefs* *of* *Staff* *it*  
*would* *be* *interesting* *to* *know* *who*



15 proposed for the post of G.O.P.  
British troops in China

Mr. Robinson & Col. Chalmers  
have seen the report (16)

Pat  
A. Lee  
14/4/45

- 18 Tel 248 To Chungking ——— 2/4/45  
19 Tel 327 from Chungking ——— 4/4/45  
20 This P.S. ——— 5/4/45  
21 Tel 85767 to Chungking ——— 16/4/45  
22 Robinson (To.) ——— 14/4/45  
He Stead

? you are getting a  
copy of the relevant minutes of  
the Chiefs of Staff 88th meeting. A  
approving (17) there has been  
provision to go with you please  
send to

asked for on  
19/4 & again  
on 23/4  
23/4

Mr. MacDougal  
Col. Chalmers  
Mr. Bates to see  
Mr. Gair

A. Lee  
19/4



24 No. Tel 96994 To Chungking 28/5/45

25 No. Tel 0/0040 from Chungking 16/7/45

46 Tel 0/0040 from Hon. Mr. Chungking — 16/7/45

Mr Macgregor to see pl

Mr. M.

Reed

24/7

25/7